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Abstract
Research shows that ethnic identification increases on the eve of competitive elec-
tions in Africa, but does it do so at the expense of national solidarities? Do com-
petitive elections exacerbate the negative expressions of strong ethnic attachments-
coethnic favoritism, relative status concerns, and social distance to other groups? 
These questions are important because the latter attitudes and perceptions are linked 
to a host of ills in democracies. In this paper, I examine how the proximity and com-
petitiveness of national elections influence ingroup favoritism, ethnic groups’ status 
anxieties, perceived discrimination, and trust in Sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on six 
rounds of survey data for seventeen countries over 14 years, I find that national iden-
tities diminish in salience relative to ethnic ones as political competition increases, 
and that this is accompanied by heightened perceptions of ethnically-motivated 
discrimination, increased status anxieties, and lower levels of both inter-ethnic and 
generalized trust closer to nationally-competitive elections. Therefore, the electoral 
cycle strongly influences group anxieties in plural societies where political competi-
tion is high, and should be taken into account when designing measures to mitigate 
ethnic polarization in multi-ethnic states.
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Strong ethnic attachments are often seen as undermining national projects.1 A 
large literature links ethnic identities with state fragmentation, often through 
violent secession (Cederman et  al. 2010; Hale 2008; Sambanis 2001; Peterson 
2002). Fostering national unity is a particular challenge for states in Sub-Saharan 
Africa because of their high ethno-linguistic diversity and the largely artificial 
colonial borders partitioning cohesive groups among multiple countries (Herbst 
1989; Young 1979).
Instrumentalist theories of ethnicity posit that ethnic attachments persist 
because they are “useful” in extracting benefits from the state (Chandra 2007; 
Eifert et al. 2010; Ichino and Nathan 2013). Within the currently dominant con-
structivist understanding of identity formation, there is also a near consensus 
that ethnic identities are malleable, contingent, and situational (Chandra 2012). 
This has in turn led to expectations that ethnic identities should vary over time 
(Kuo and Margalit 2012) and would become more salient when access to states’ 
resources is up for grabs, such as when national elections approach (Eifert et al. 
2010).
Apart from being malleable and constructed, ethnic identities are also inher-
ently social and relational. Research from various disciplines draws attention to 
the importance of group boundaries (Barth 1998; Wimmer 2013), ethnic commu-
nities’ relative status and position vis-a-vis others (Blumer 1958; Horowitz 1985), 
and the ingroup favoritism/outgroup solidarity trade-off inherent in strong group 
attachments. The Social Psychology literature asserts that strong ethnic identities 
are invariably accompanied by ethnocentrism expressed as ingroup favoritism and 
hostility towards outgroups, and frequently manifesting as mistrust, prejudice, and 
perceived discrimination (Brewer 1981; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Tajfel 1982). 
Within these perspectives, the political salience of ethnic identities is itself a func-
tion of the strength of the boundaries groups create and maintain vis-a-vis each 
other (Wimmer 2008).
Does political competition lead to a decrease in the relative salience of national 
attachments in Sub-Saharan Africa? Does it also heighten group anxieties and 
diminish inter-ethnic trust? These questions are important because the relative 
strength of ethnic compared to national loyalties is an important indicator of social 
cohesion (Easterly et  al. 2006; Maxwell 2009), and has implications for the way 
societies function overall (Collier 2011). Ethnocentrism is linked to entrenched 
inequality, stunted growth, preference polarization, and communal violence in new 
democracies (Easterly and Levine 1997; Horowitz 1985; Wilkinson 2005). The liter-
ature on civil wars establishes a direct link between ethnic fears and resentments and 
the severity of conflict (Bhavnani and Miodownik 2009) and shows that elections 
increase ethnic groups’ likelihood of resorting to violence (Cederman et al. 2013). 
The same processes that heighten ethnic identification are expected to also cause 




shifts in pan-ethnic or cross-ethnic solidarities, and influence individuals’ percep-
tions of relative group status and attitudes towards other groups.
Despite the centrality of these issues to governance and politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and beyond, studies of the effects of political competition on national identi-
fication and attitudes towards out-groups are rare and focus on individual countries 
only e.g. (Ichino and Nathan 2013; Kasara 2013; Michelitch 2015). The few exist-
ing comparative studies on ethnic and national identities in Africa do not allow for 
temporal variation in national identification in response to the political environment, 
largely because of data constraints (Robinson 2014).2
In this paper, I examine the effect of political competition on the relative salience 
of national versus ethnic identification in Sub-Saharan Africa and study the extent 
to which some of the negative attitudinal expressions of strong ethnic identities are 
also heightened as a result of political competition. In particular, I study whether 
proximity to closely-fought elections increases perceptions of ethnically-motivated 
discrimination, relative status concerns, and support for ingroup favoritism, and 
whether it lowers ethnic and generalized trust. Empirically, I utilize six rounds of 
Afrobarometer surveys for seventeen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This data 
allows for variation over time on a number of key measures of interest related to 
respondents’ choice of ethnic or national identity, patronage attitudes, perceived dis-
crimination, status anxieties, and ethnic and generalized trust.
I find that respondents are less likely to identify in national relative to ethnic 
terms close to competitive elections. Reduced national identification is accompanied 
by heightened perceptions of ethnically-motivated discrimination, increased relative 
status concerns, and lower levels of both inter-ethnic and generalized trust. Remark-
ably, all these accompanying anxieties worsen as competitive national elections 
approach. In contrast, I find little evidence that competition-driven ethnic identifi-
cation is purely instrumental: respondents are not more likely to expect patronage 
from elected officials or condone ethnic favoritism closer to competitive elections. 
The nature of the data does not allow me to dismiss instrumental motivations behind 
ethnic identification and response bias remains a concern. However, it is likely that 
these instrumental motivations are accompanied by and expressed through strong 
affective responses. The results suggest that we require models of politics able to 
better integrate the affective and instrumental aspects of ethnic attachments in order 
to fully grasp the impact of the political environment on group solidarities.
The paper contributes to two distinct literatures. First, it speaks directly to find-
ings by Eifert et al. (2010) on the effect of the proximity to competitive elections on 
the salience of ethnic identities in Africa. It advances these findings by deriving two 
channels, through which the political environment heightens ethnic identification, 
and testing for their observable implications. Which channel is at work matters a 
great deal because unlike purely instrumental ethnicity, anxiety or discrimination-
induced ethnic identification is accompanied by rejection of common identities and 
institutions, and increased hostility towards out-groups. This in turn severely hinders 
2 For a notable exception, see Higashijima and Houle (2018).
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the development of the common sense of belonging seen as crucial for the success 
of plural societies.
The results show that competitive elections in Africa are accompanied by a much 
higher increase in ethnic grievances and relative status anxieties compared to land-
slide elections. Several distinct literatures from Sociology, Social Psychology, and 
Political Science posit a causal link between ethnic anxieties and increased ethnic 
identification. Therefore, it is plausible that ethnic identification is higher closer to 
competitive elections in Africa because the competitive campaign environment sur-
rounding these contests exacerbates ethnic anxieties in ways that landslide elections 
just do not do.
The findings should not be interpreted as an argument against political com-
petition, however. The results show that ethnic anxieties are more sensitive to the 
electoral cycle in countries where political competition is high than in countries 
with landslide elections: in the former, anxieties rise around elections, but fall mid-
election cycle; in the latter, ethnic anxieties are relatively higher but more stable 
throughout. Thus, in order to reap the benefits of democratization and increased 
political competition, measures intended to address ethnic grievances in plural soci-
eties should also take into account the timing of the electoral cycle and anticipate 
these fluctuations.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on nationalism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In contrast to work treating national identification as relatively stable over 
the medium to short term, it shows that national identification fluctuates in relation 
to the electoral cycle. This finding brings research on nationalism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in line with other work highlighting temporal variation in national self-identi-
fication in other parts of the world (Kuo and Margalit 2012).
How Do Competitive Elections Affect the Relative Salience 
of National Versus Ethnic Identities?
The existing literature puts forward two separate channels, through which the politi-
cal context and campaign environment could affect the relative salience of national 
compared to ethnic identities in Africa. The first is instrumental and operates 
through the expectation of patronage (Bates 1983; Chandra 2007; Fearon 1999).3 
Within this perspective, ethnic identities are seen as tools for accessing power and 
are thus most valuable around election times. In low information environments in 
particular, ethnic parties strengthen ethnic identities by using ethnicity to signal 
future redistribution (Posner 2005; Chandra 2007). Ethnic parties appeal to coeth-
nics and coethnics support ethnic parties because of expectations regarding the 
distribution of resources. Electoral campaigns can activate this channel by remind-
ing voters of what they stand to gain by supporting a (coethnic) candidate. Voters 
would in turn face incentives to signal their ethnic identities to candidates in the 




expectation of future rewards. The closer the election, the more voters stand to either 
gain or lose, so the stronger the incentives to seek out information and signal eth-
nic belonging. Competitive elections are characterized by bigger campaign efforts 
reflected in higher spending and communication volumes (Trumm et al. 2017), have 
higher voter turnout (Franklin et al. 2004), and more informed voters overall (Gie-
bler et al. 2017). Recent studies of campaign effects in Africa show that voters seek 
out and are influenced by political communication prior to elections (Weghorst and 
Lindberg 2013; Carlson 2015; Conroy-Krutz et al. 2016).
The second channel relates to the affective value of ethnic attachments and oper-
ates when groups are experiencing uncertainty and anxiety related to relative status 
concerns (Horowitz 1985). Attitudinally, this is expressed in perceptions of group 
danger or threat, ethnically-motivated discrimination or unfair treatment in the 
hands of a central government. The Social Psychology literature links such percep-
tions to heightened in-group favoritism and identification, accompanied by increased 
social distance to other groups (Bogardus 1928; Tajfel 1982). The “rejection-dis-
identification” model ties perceived discrimination to reduced national identification 
directly by viewing increased ethnic identification as a way individuals cope with 
discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti et  al. 2009). Closely-fought election campaigns 
are more likely to feature negative campaign messages and attacks (Skaperdas and 
Grofman 1995; Harrington Jr and Hess 1996) and are shown to be more polarizing 
(Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen 2017) so we can expect campaign rhetoric around 
close elections in particular to result in heightened group anxieties and perceived 
discrimination.
It is important to note that these two channels are not mutually exclusive and may 
operate in tandem: individuals concerned about access to resources may also experi-
ence fears of loss of status, concerns about lack of recognition, and feel emotional 
attachment to their ethnic identities. They echo the distinction between instrumen-
tal and value rationality originally made by Weber (1978).4 Scholars of nationalism 
and ethnic conflict convincingly argue that a combination of the two best explains 
ethnic and nationalist behavior (Varshney 2003). Thus, in the context of competi-
tive elections, polarizing campaign rhetoric relying on discourses of discrimination, 
victimization, and threat can simultaneously increase expectations of favoritism and 
exacerbate individual perceptions of status anxiety (Iyengar et al. 2012).
Campaign narratives and tropes are shown to evoke pride, grievances, or con-
tempt related to ethnic belonging by focusing on stories of discrimination, margin-
alization, unfair or unequal treatment, often in the hands of the central government 
(Gadjanova 2013). These “constructions of grievance” in turn legitimate violence 
and spur collective action in the name of common identities, even when conflicts 
have ostensibly material origins as with disputes over land or natural resources 
(Aspinall 2007; Boone 2011). Apart from direct exposure to campaign appeals, the 
polarized political environment surrounding contested elections in Sub-Saharan 
Africa can increase the relative salience of ethnic attachments indirectly: through 
4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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(social) media and everyday social interactions, including instances of ethnically-
motivated discrimination and micro aggression (Burbidge 2014; Michelitch 2015).
In sum, the instrumental channel linking the political environment with ethnic 
identification suggests that ethnic identification should be accompanied with a set of 
attitudes and expectations regarding ethnic favoritism and the distribution of patron-
age. The affective channel would lead us to expect that perceived discrimination, 
status anxiety, and lower inter-ethnic trust accompany ethnic attachments. Exam-
ining the attitudinal corollaries of strong ethnic attachments is important because 
these attitudes and perceptions are shown to have real consequences for inter-group 
relations in plural societies. If strong ethnic identification is taken up as a means 
to withdraw from the state in response to perceived discrimination, we can expect 
much intransigence, unwillingness to compromise, decision-making deadlock, even 
violence. On the other hand, manipulating patronage attitudes and fostering expecta-
tions of ethnic favoritism among voters can create strong incentives for politicians 
to extract resources from the state in order to strategically funnel development. In 
the long run, this increases corruption, creates inequality, undermines state capacity, 
and reduces trust in institutions and the democratic process overall.
Data and Methodology
I employ Afrobarometer data collected during rounds 2–7 between 2004 and 2018 
in the following countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Libe-
ria, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The seventeen countries held regular elec-
tions and were surveyed more than once between 2004 and 2018. Multiple country 
samples over time allow me to use hierarchical models with both random and fixed 
effects and to hold constant a range of country and round-level factors that can affect 
respondents’ ethnic or national identification and its accompanying attitudes and 
perceptions: countries’ (precolonial) history, various institutions including degrees 
of centralization and the type of the executive, levels of diversity, colonial past, the 
nation-building legacy of leaders, levels of democracy, the presence of ethnic move-
ments and parties, levels of economic development, and history of ethnic violence 
(Bossuroy 2008; Miguel and Posner 2006; Robinson 2014; Chandra 2007).
The variable on the national versus ethnic identity trade-off comes from responses 
to the question:
“Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] 
and being a [respondent’s (ethnic) identity group]. Which of these two groups do 
you feel most strongly attached to?”
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The variable takes two values: 1 if respondents gave “national identity” as the 
identity they feel more or only attached to, 0 otherwise.5 It has several advantages, 
which makes it suitable for the purposes of this paper. As other research has noted 
(Robinson 2014), because it is relative, this measure is comparable across respond-
ents and countries. It is also consistent with constructivist notions that individuals 
hold multiple identities simultaneously. Unlike absolute measures, the question can 
also capture the relative strength of ethnic attachments and is thus consistent with 
measures of ethnocentrism from Social Psychology.
I expect respondents’ choice of national versus ethnic identity to be systemati-
cally related to a set of shifting attitudes and perceptions regarding ethnic favorit-
ism and the distribution of patronage, relative status concerns, and social distance 
to other ethnic groups.6 The identity choice of respondent i in country c at a time t 
( Eict) can therefore be expressed as:
The situational and contingent part of respondents’ relative attachment to national 








The vector Xict contains individual characteristics such as gender, age, place of 
residence, education, and employment status. Other research on Sub-Saharan Africa 
shows these are strong predictors of respondents’ national identification (Robinson 
2014). Media exposure and the level of public interest likely also influence the effect 
of the political environment on identity choice. I proxy media exposure by answers 
to questions about the frequency, with which respondents read newspapers, listen to 
the radio, or watch TV.7 The level of public interest is gauged from responses to the 
question “How interested would you say you are in public affairs?”, transformed into 
a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 2 (a lot).
Within this vector, I also include a measure of whether a respondent belongs to 
the majority or plurality group in each country and whether their ethnic group con-
trols government.8 There are several reasons to expect ethnic relative to national 
attachments to have different attitudinal corollaries among pluralities versus minori-
ties and among groups in power versus powerless or disenfranchised populations. 
Theories emphasizing the effect of group size on ethnic mobilization (Posner 2005) 
(1)Eict = Yict + Xict + ict
5 Note that from Afrobarometer round 3 onwards, respondents were given the option of rating their eth-
nic and national identities as equal. Therefore, the data also includes an ethnic identity variable coded 0 
if respondents identified with their national identities more or only, 1 if they identified equally with eth-
nic and national identity, and 2 if they identified with their ethnic identities more or only. See the Online 
Appendix for details on how this varies across countries and rounds.
6 In line with the Social Psychology literature, I refer to perceived discrimination and low levels of inter-
ethnic trust as “social distance”.
7 Factor variable, Eigenvalue = 1.225, AIC = 6.000, BIC = 34.972.
8 I use a measure of government control rather than inclusion for two reasons, one theoretical and one 
methodological: first, Africa’s states often have broad coalition governments and a powerful centralized 
executive in the form of the presidency. Taking mere inclusion in government as signifying power would 
overstate some ethnic groups’ true position. And second, the latter would provide very little variation on 
the variable because most ethnic groups are formally represented in coalition governments.
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expect that individuals would self-select into larger ethnic identities in order to form 
minimum winning coalitions with a view to extracting resources from the state. 
Thus, instrumental motivations and expectations of ethnic favoritism may be more 
prevalent among members of plurality groups.
Larger groups or groups controlling government may see national identification 
as a means to state resources, however: Wimmer (1997) has described politics in 
post-colonial societies as a struggle over “who owns the state”, suggesting there 
may be a link between instrumental self-identification and national identity. In other 
words, members of the plurality groups may identify with their national identity 
more than minorities, and this may still be driven by expectations of patronage and 
favoritism. Thus, plurality/majority group status and being in power could confound 
the relationship between patronage expectations and ethnic identification. Further, 
research on minority mobilization in other parts of the world shows that minori-
ties experience more status anxiety and perceived discrimination than majorities, 
so should be more prone to grievance-based national dis-identification, particularly 
when not in power (Barreto and Pedraza 2009).
Finally, I also control for whether respondents are ruling party supporters in line 
with studies showing that this mediates attitudes towards democracy and govern-
ment institutions in new democracies (Moehler 2009; Curini et al. 2012).
ict contains idiosyncratic levels of ethnic or national attachments that cannot be 
directly observed.
I then proceed to examine the extent to which the part of ethnic attachments 
determined by attitudes to patronage or group anxieties Yict is itself a function of the 
political environment (2).
The vector Zct contains country-level factors, of which the proximity and competi-
tiveness of the presidential election are the key predictors of interest. Presidential 
elections are arguably the most consequential political events in Sub-Saharan Africa 
because of the highly centralized nature of power and government authority (Posner 
and Young 2007).9
Following Eifert et al. (2010), I define proximity as − 1 times the absolute num-
ber of months between the day the survey was administered and the closest presi-
dential election, and competitiveness as − 1 times the difference in the percentage 
vote share between the winner and the runner up. For analytical purposes, I divide 
elections into three categories: (1) competitive: those with a margin of victory of 
less than 10%, (2) less competitive: those with a margin of victory between 10 and 
31%, and (3) landslides: those with a margin of victory of over 31%.
I divide competitiveness into three distinct categories for the following reasons: 
first, it is not reasonable to expect that a unit change in competitiveness (in this 
case 1%) has a linear and cumulative effect on voter behavior. Electoral contests 
(2)Yict = Xict + Zct + ict




perceived to be competitive are more likely to be behaviorally significant instead and 
a margin of victory of 10% or less is a commonly-cited measure of highly competi-
tive elections. Prior to elections, citizens are unlikely to know the exact margin of 
victory, but will likely have expectations based on information acquired from a vari-
ety of sources: the media, the campaigns themselves, opinion polls (a central feature 
of African elections since the early 2000s), and from citizens’ knowledge of past 
contests or down-ballot races. These assessments will not be precise, but will fall 
into broader competitiveness categories often delineated using horse-race reporting 
tropes such as “neck-and-neck”, “close”, “X candidate or party leading in polls”, or 
“Y candidate or party leading by a large margin/heading for a landslide”.
While the literature is less clear on what constitutes a landslide victory, common 
measures include margins of victory over 20% or winning 60% of the popular vote. 
The 31% cut-off adopted here corresponds to 60% of the popular vote or over and is 
useful because it splits the sample of non-competitive elections evenly thus provid-
ing sufficient power to examine the effect of large changes in competitiveness at the 
lower ends of the competitiveness measure (Table 1).10 Robustness checks show that 
results are not an artefact of the cut-off points used and are robust to a different cut-
off and a linear competitiveness measure (see the Online Appendix).
Table 1  Characteristics of the sample
Country Electoral margin of victory Months to elec-
tion
Total Rounds
Over 31% 10–31% Less than 10% Min Max
Benin 0 5998 0 − 28 − 8 5998 3–7
Botswana 1200 5998 0 − 28 − 3 7198 2–7
Burkina Faso 2400 2400 0 − 26 − 7 4800 4–7
Ghana 0 0 10,797 − 21 − 3 10,797 2–7
Kenya 0 3676 7499 − 21 − 2 11,175 2–7
Liberia 0 4798 0 − 35 − 9 4798 4–7
Malawi 1200 0 8407 − 29 − 1 9607 2–7
Mali 6076 0 1283 − 23 − 6 7359 2–7
Mozambique 6190 4800 0 − 28 − 6 10,990 2–7
Namibia 5999 1200 0 − 25 − 2 7199 2–7
Nigeria 4687 6428 2400 − 22 − 2 13,515 2–7
Senegal 4800 1200 1200 − 34 − 12 7200 2–7
South Africa 13,829 0 0 − 31 − 5 13,829 2–7
Tanzania 6135 4786 0 − 30 − 4 10,921 2–7
Uganda 5456 7775 0 − 30 − 9 13,231 2–7
Zambia 0 1200 5997 − 17 − 3 7197 2–7
Zimbabwe 0 5904 3448 − 30 − 1 9352 2–7
Total 57,972 56,163 41,031 155,166



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I also include an interaction term between proximity and competitiveness to allow 
for the change in attitudes and perceptions to depend on the competitiveness of the 
race as elections approach. I allow the vector Xict containing individual covariates 
to also influence how the political environment affects individual attitudes towards 
ethnic patronage or social distance to other groups.
Eight of the seventeen countries in the sample had competitive elections, and 11 
had landslides (Table 1). The majority (13 countries) had both competitive and non-
competitive elections. This within-country variation provides leverage for estimating 
the effects of the interaction between proximity and competitiveness on ethnic iden-
tification and its attitudinal corollaries.
The questions used to capture respondents’ support for ethnic favoritism, status 
anxiety, perceived discrimination, and inter-ethnic trust are summarized in Table 2. 
The intuition behind the favoritism measures is that respondents who expect patron-
age from elected officials would be more likely to deem these practices “not wrong 
at all” or “wrong but understandable”. Research on electoral clientelism in Sub-
Saharan Africa shows that voters openly expect and demand patronage from candi-
dates during the election campaigns, particularly in rural areas (Nugent 2001; Gad-
janova 2017). Further, exposure to the competitive campaign environment where 
cash and other electoral “goodies” are frequently disbursed could affect attitudinal 
change along this dimension by making ethnic favoritism more acceptable overall.
Response bias is a particular concern with the first two favoritism questions. Polit-
ical campaigns and media coverage may sensitize individuals by exposing patronage 
practices so respondents may instead understate their own support for the distri-
bution of patronage by politicians as elections approach. Such a boomerang effect 
could be conditional on media exposure, education, and the level of the individual’s 
public involvement and could manifest as differences between urban and rural vot-
ers, for example. I take a number of steps to minimize this bias (as detailed in Sect. 4 
below). The third favoritism question should be less subject to social desirability 
bias, however, and would thus more likely reflect general perceptions regarding the 
distribution of patronage in respondents’ immediate environments.
The Social Psychology literature highlights the centrality of negative group com-
parisons and individual perceptions of social position to status anxiety (Brewer 
1981; Sherif et  al. 1961). In line with this literature, I take respondents’ rating 
of their ethnic groups’ economic conditions and political influence as “worse” 
or “much worse” as indicative of high status anxiety. Perceived discrimination is 
captured by responses to the question “How often is [respondent’s identity group] 
treated unfairly by the government?” and inter-ethnic trust by responses to the ques-
tion “How much do you trust members of other ethnic groups?”.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I test whether proximity to competi-
tive elections reduces national identification. Second, I examine whether expecta-
tions of ethnic favoritism, status anxieties, perceived discrimination, and (low) inter-
ethnic trust predict respondents’ choice of ethnic over national identity. And third, I 




To estimate Eqs. (1) and (2), I specify a number of mixed effects logit models 
with random intercepts for countries.11 As robustness checks, I re-estimate the mod-
els using mixed effects ordinal logit and OLS (see Sects. 4 and 5 below), as well as a 
series of logit models with country fixed effects (in the Online Appendix). All mod-
els include round fixed effects, time trend controls, and frequency weights.12
Table 3  Competitive elections and national identification
Note: In models 1-2, national identity is coded 1 if respondents reported they were more or only attached 
to their national identity, 0 otherwise. Models 3-4 report results for national identity from an ordinal logit 
model, in which the dependent variable is a scale (0-ethnic identity more or only, 1-ethnic and national 
identity equal, 2-national identity more or only). Models 1-3 are mixed (hierarchical) logit models with 
observations clustered within countries. Columns 1-3 report logit coefficients. Model 4 is a random 
effects linear model and column 4 reports OLS coefficients. All models include round fixed effects, time 
trends, and are weighted 1/total number of respondents per country. All models are also robust to includ-
ing country fixed effects. The Online Appendix shows additional model specifications.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model 1 Logit 
National id.
Model 2 Logit 
National id.
Model 3 Ordinal 
logit National id.
Model 4 OLS 
National id. 
scale
Proximity to election 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003***
Compet. scale
 Margin > 31% (Base) (Base) (Base) (Base)
 Margin 10%–31% − 0.051 0.137*** 0.022 0.001
 Margin < 10% − 0.194*** 0.066 0.052 0.016
Proximity*Compet. scale
 Margin > 31% (Base) (Base) (Base) (Base)
 10%–31% 0.005*** 0.006*** − 0.001 − 0.000
 Margin < 10% − 0.009*** − 0.019*** − 0.012*** − 0.004***
N 144,190 95,553 127,770 127,770
Wald Chi2 3670.85 878.82 873.82 1411.57
Individual covariates No Yes No No
Social des. bias controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
12 Time trend variables are used in time series regressions to account for those unobservable variables 
influencing the dependent variable, which are highly-correlated with time (Wooldridge 2016). At the 
state level, these can be regime trends (democratization or autocratization), economic development, party 
institutionalization, etc., at the individual level they can capture gradual changes in voter preferences, for 
example. Each observation is weighted as 1/total number of survey responses from the same country.
11 Mixed effects logit models (also known as hierarchical or multilevel logit models) are appropriate 
when data are clustered, as is the case here: individual respondents are clustered within countries and 
multiple surveys exist per country (McCulloch and Neuhaus 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
Because random effects models are specifically intended to account for group-level (cluster) correlation 
among observations, Gelman and Hill (2006) recommend to “always use multilevel modeling (random 
effects)” for hierarchical data and show that these models outperform alternatives in estimates of vote 
choice using state-level opinion polling in the United States (Gelman and Hill 2006: 301–321).
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Does Political Competition Reduce National Identification in Africa?
Before I turn to the attitudinal corollaries of strong ethnic attachments and their 
political determinants, I briefly examine the effect of the political environment on 
the relative strength of ethnic and national identification in Sub-Saharan Africa. I 
test whether proximity to competitive elections makes respondents less likely to 
identify in national relative to ethnic terms.
The estimates show that proximity to competitive elections reduces national 
identification in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results are robust to different model 
specifications, round and country fixed effects, a host of individual covariates, 
and social desirability bias controls (Table 3, see the  Online Appendix for addi-
tional specifications). The interaction term of the temporal proximity to elections 
and electoral competitiveness is illustrated in Fig. 1, where I juxtapose the effect 
of proximity on ethnic identification for competitive elections (those with a mar-
gin of victory of less than 10 victory above 10 above 31.
There is a 10identity over the range of the proximity variable for competitive 
elections (equivalent to close to a 0.5accompanied with a 5respondents will iden-
tify with their ethnic identities only. For elections where the vote difference was 
above 10to the election date actually increases national relative to ethnic identifi-
cation, Table 3).
These results are in line with empirical findings on the salience of ethnic iden-
tities using previous Afrobarometer rounds (Eifert et  al. 2010). Further, they 
Fig. 1  Competitive elections and national versus ethnic identification. Note Predicted probabilities with 
95 CI. All covariates held at their means
 Political Behavior
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suggest that like ethnic identities, national attachments in Africa are not static, 
but depend on the political context. The electoral cycle matters, as does the over-
all competitiveness of the race. The majority of the reduction in the relative sali-
ence of national identities is channelled in ethnic and national identities being 
seen as equal. There is, however, a concurrent increase in individuals identifying 
exclusively in ethnic terms close to competitive elections. One way to gain insight 
into the mechanisms underlying these shifts in relative identification is to exam-
ine what attitudes and perceptions accompany individuals’ choice of ethnic over 
national identity. I turn to this question in the section below.
What Attitudes and Perceptions Accompany Strong Ethnic 
Attachments in Africa?
The literature on the link between ethnic identification and competitive elec-
tions suggests two sets of corollaries to strong ethnic attachments: those related to 
expectations of ethnic favoritism, and those related to relative status concerns and 
increased social distance to other ethnic groups. Table  4 lists the results from a 
series of logit models of the attitudinal determinants of strong ethnic attachments.13
I find that support for ethnic favoritism, perceived discrimination, and status anxi-
eties are all associated with respondents’ choice of ethnic identities at the expense of 
Table 4  Attitudes and perceptions accompanying strong ethnic attachments in Africa
Note Mixed (hierarchical) logit models with observations clustered within countries. Marginal effects 
(dy/dx) reported. All models include round fixed effects, time trends, and are weighted 1/total number of 
respondents per country.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Additional specifications in the Online Appendix
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Leaders should help own community 0.007*** 0.003** 0.002 0.002
Jobs for relatives 0.006 0.003
Development for supporters 0.006 0.004
Perceived discrimination 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.046***
Economic anxieties 0.008** 0.008**
Political anxieties 0.003 0.003
Ethnic trust − 0.003 − 0.004
N 81,957 62,995 17,358 16,260 15,590
Wald Chi2 4974.00 1728.31 328.60 455.63 434.15
Individual covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social des. bias controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes




national ones (Table 4). The affective variables (perceived discrimination and rela-
tive status anxieties in particular) are overall stronger and more robust.
It is possible that the questions related to patronage are subject to more 
response bias than questions regarding ethnic groups’ relative status and per-
ceived discrimination, suppressing the magnitude of the instrumental attitudes. 
While such bias cannot be completely ruled out, I address it in two additional 
ways. First, I identify a set of questions, which should be subject to similar bias, 
drop observations suspect of bias on these questions, and re-estimate the mod-
els using the remaining observations. Second, I re-run all models using coeth-
nic interviewers only, expecting either that respondents would be more willing 
to admit their true attitudes regarding patronage when facing coethnics, or that 
facing coethnics would result in respondents’ privileging co-ethnic favoritism 
(Habyarimana et al. 2009). The Online Appendix lists results of estimations keep-
ing only respondents who admitted to paying a bribe for a document or permit 
and those interviewed by a coethnic. The main results reported in Table 4 do not 
change with the introduction of these additional checks.
Members of plurality/majority groups, groups controlling government, and 
ruling party supporters are all significantly less likely to privilege their ethnic 
Table 5  Competitive elections and perceived discrimination
Note: In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents reported their ethnic group 
was “sometimes” or “often” discriminated against, 0 otherwise. In Models 3-4, the dependent variable 
is the perceived discrimination scale described in Table  2. Models 1–2 are mixed (hierarchical) logit 
models with observations clustered within countries. Model 3 is a multinomial logit model with country 
fixed effects, the coefficients reported are for “ethnic group sometimes treated unfairly” against the base 
“ethnic group never treated unfairly”. Model 4 is a random effects linear model. Columns 1-3 report logit 
coefficients and column 4 reports OLS coefficients. All models include round fixed effects, time trends, 
and are weighted 1/total number of respondents per country. Models 1, 2, and 4 are robust to including 
country fixed effects. The Online Appendix shows additional specifications.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model 1 logit Model 2 logit Model 3 multino-
mial logit
Model 4 OLS
Proximity 0.001*** 0.003** 0.001 0.001**
Compet. scale
 Margin > 31% (Base) (Base) (Base) (Base)
 =Margin 10–31% − 0.296*** − 0.274*** − 0.255*** − 0.108***
 Margin  < 10% − 0.065* − 0.116*** − 0.070 − 0.008
Proximity × Compet. scale
 Margin > 31% (Base) (Base) (Base) (Base)
 10–31% − 0.004** − 0.004* − 0.004* − 0.002***
 Margin  < 10% 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.003***
N 138,836 130,113 130,113 138,836
Wald or LR Chi2 6005.09 7626.33 25595.98 5478.21
Individual covariates No Yes Yes No
Social des. bias controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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relative to their national identities across model specifications (in the Online 
Appendix). This result contradicts expectations that larger groups would identify 
in ethnic terms prior to competitive elections in order to form minimum winning 
coalitions, but is in line with two theories of the relationship between group size 
and the choice between ethnic and national identification: the “state ownership” 
theory expecting larger groups and particularly those in power to be more likely 
to identify in national terms because they perceive themselves as controlling the 
state, and the “rejection-disidentification” model suggesting that ethnic identifica-
tion is taken up as a defensive reaction to powerlessness and minority status in 
plural societies.
In sum, strong ethnic relative to national identification in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
accompanied by a host of group anxieties. The literature from Sociology and Social 
Psychology briefly reviewed above posits a direct causal link between relative sta-
tus concerns, perceived discrimination, and an increase in ethnic identification. The 
heated campaign environment around competitive elections in Sub-Saharan Africa 
could also exacerbate relative status concerns and increase individual perceptions of 
ethnically-motivated discrimination resulting in worsening group anxieties as com-
petitive elections approach.
Competitive Elections, Perceived Discrimination, and Relative Status 
Anxieties in Africa
I proceed to examine how the timing and competitiveness of elections influence the 
affective variables associated with strong ethnic relative to national attachments. 
Estimates for the effects of political competition on perceived discrimination-
the strongest predictor of respondents’ probability of identifying with their ethnic 
group rather than the common state—are shown in Table 5. I find that proximity 
Fig. 2  Competitive elections and perceived discrimination. Note Predicted probabilities with 95 held at 




Fig. 3  Competitive elections and relative status anxieties. Note Predicted probabilities with 95 intervals. 
All covariates held at their means. Detailed results tables and additional specifications in the Online 
Appendix
Fig. 4  Competitive elections and ethnic and generalized Trust. Note Predicted probabilities with 95inter-




to competitive elections significantly increases the likelihood that respondents will 
deem their ethnic group as being treated unfairly by the central government. The 
effect of proximity is conditional on the competitiveness of the race and the interac-
tion is illustrated in Fig. 2.
For competitive elections (those with a margin of victory of less than 10percep-
tion of ethnically-motivated discrimination close to the election date. The predicted 
probability that respondents will deem their ethnic group as treated unfairly by the 
central government increases at a rate of approximately 0.5closer to a presiden-
tial election.14 Because perceived discrimination is an important measure of social 
cohesion and is shown to affect other attitudes such as respondents’ overall support 
for democracy, its fluctuation related to elections is a source of concern in African 
democracies.
I also trace the effect of the proximity to presidential elections and their com-
petitiveness on individuals’ relative status anxieties. I find a strong and substantively 
large effect of proximity to competitive elections on respondents’ relative status con-
cerns (Fig. 3). The probability that respondents would see their ethnic groups’ eco-
nomic conditions and political influence as “worse” or “much worse” than those of 
other ethnic groups increases at a rate of almost 1elections.
Fig. 5  Perceived discrimination by competitiveness and ethnic group size. Note Predicted probabilities 
with 95intervals. All covariates held at their means. Detailed results tables and additional specifications 
in the Online Appendix
14 The results are robust to controlling for whether the election date was in the future (approaching) or in 
the past (in the Online Appendix).
1 3
Political Behavior 
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the effect proximity to national-level elections has on inter-
ethnic and generalized trust at different levels of electoral competitiveness.15 Out-
side of landslide elections, the predicted probability of a respondent saying they do 
not trust members of other ethnic groups at all increases by close to 20, with most 
of the increase taking place during the twelve months closest to the election. A word 
of caution regarding the ethnic trust estimates is due: Afrobarometer data on lev-
els of inter-ethnic trust is only available for Round 3 (2005–2006). The results are 
thus based on a smaller sample, there is no within-country variation on the proxim-
ity variable, and estimates are driven by competitive races in Ghana, Kenya, and 
Malawi only. The generalized trust measure is available in both Rounds 3 and 5, 
improving the estimates’ precision and confidence in the results. Fig. 4, right panel, 
shows that there is also a sharp drop in levels of generalized trust closer to presiden-
tial elections, and that this effect is limited to competitive elections only. Levels of 
generalized trust closer to less competitive races remain virtually unchanged.
The anxieties mechanism can also be demonstrated by comparing how perceived 
discrimination varies between plurality groups and minorities as competitive elec-
tions approach. The rejection-dis-identification model of ethnic identification pre-
dicts that minority groups in particular will reject common identities in response to 
Fig. 6  Perceived discrimination by competitiveness and rally attendance. Note Predicted probabilities 
with 95 intervals. All covariates held at their means. Detailed results tables and additional specifications 
in the Online Appendix
15 Generalized trust coded 1 if respondents answered “Most people can be trusted”, 0 if “You must be 
very careful” to “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be 
very careful in dealing with people?”.
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discrimination and unfair treatment, so we should expect to see greater divergence 
in levels of perceived discrimination between minority and majority/plurality groups 
when the anxieties mechanism is in play. Group size is also plausibly exogenous to 
the electoral cycle and the competitiveness of the election.
Figure 5, right panel, shows that minority groups are more likely to perceive eth-
nically-based discrimination close to competitive elections, while levels of perceived 
discrimination for plurality groups actually slightly decrease. This suggests that the 
increase of ethnic identification close to competitive elections in Africa is largely 
driven by aggrieved minority groups rejecting national identities in response to per-
ceived discrimination. Comparing perceived discrimination by ethnic group size and 
electoral competitiveness (left, middle, and right panel of Fig.  5) also points to a much 
higher level of ethnic polarization close to competitive elections in particular, which is 
not evident for elections with winning margins >10%.
Do anxieties result from the polarized campaign environment that likely precedes 
competitive elections or could they be due to other factors, such as disputed results or 
(fears of) electoral violence? While the current data does not allow me to fully disen-
tangle these potential explanations, it is instructive to examine how perceived discrimi-
nation varies by levels of rally attendance. Rallies are the primary means of campaign 
communication in Sub-Saharan Africa (Paget 2019) so rally attendance is a reasonable 
proxy for campaign exposure.
Figure 6 shows that respondents who attended rallies are more likely to perceive 
ethnic discrimination close to competitive elections, while rally attendance does not 
correlate with perceived discrimination close to landslides. This is suggestive evidence 
pointing to the presence of campaign effects influencing perceived discrimination, and 
thus ethnic identification, close to competitive elections in Africa. Respondents inter-
ested in public affairs are also more likely to report ethnic discrimination as competi-
tive elections approach compared to those who express no such interest (in the Online 
Appendix). Finally, in the Online Appendix I also explicitly control for the effect of 
Fig. 7  Competitive elections and support for co-ethnic favoritism. Note Predicted probabilities with 




contested elections on respondents’ national identification and perceived discrimina-
tion (Appendix Tables S5 and S6), which does not change the main findings. Together, 
Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide strong evidence of a general increase in group anxieties 
close to competitive elections in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Political Competition and Support for Ethnic Favoritism
In this section, I examine the effects of political competition on individual attitudes 
towards ethnic favoritism as captured in responses to the Afrobarometer question 
asking whether leaders should benefit all or help their own communities once in 
power. There is some evidence that acceptance of ethnic favoritism also grows as 
competitive elections draw near (Fig. 7). The proximity and competitiveness vari-
ables and their interaction are significant and robust to the inclusion of individual 
covariates and social desirability controls.
Figure 7 shows a very slight increase in perceptions that leaders should benefit 
their own communities for competitive elections, but the significance of the interac-
tion term is driven by the relatively larger decrease of the acceptability of ethnic 
favoritism closer to landslide elections. One way to interpret these findings is to con-
sider that because the results in landslide elections are known well in advance, there 
is little doubt about which ethnic groups would be privileged once returned to power 
(often presidents’ coethnics and their closest allies). Given the high levels of eth-
nic diversity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Fearon 2003), the majority of Afrobarometer 
respondents are not likely to be among the lucky few. In this case, it would make 
sense that respondents should oppose ethnic favoritism by entrenched incumbents.
The results may also be capturing changes in voters’ normative attitudes towards 
patronage, rather than intrinsic support for the practice as such. Or, voter outreach 
and education efforts related to the campaigns may result in individuals viewing 
ethnic favoritism by politicians more negatively as the election date nears. Recent 
research has drawn attention to increased political knowledge resulting from elec-
toral campaigns in Africa’s competitive authoritarianisms (Conroy-Krutz 2016). The 
nature of the question and data do not allow me to distinguish between these mecha-
nisms, which may also be operating in tandem. While the evidence presented here 
is suggestive, other methods may be more suitable for capturing intrinsic attitudes 
towards ethnic favoritism in Sub-Saharan Africa and how these vary in relation to 
the proximity and competitiveness of elections (Kramon 2011).
Discussion
While the paper’s findings regarding the effect of political competition on respond-
ents’ patronage attitudes are ambivalent, political competition clearly increases 
ethnic anxieties in Sub-Saharan Africa. For three distinct literatures—on ethnic 
boundary-making, relative deprivation, and on the link between rejection and dis-




Increased ethnic anxieties around election times in Africa are reasons for con-
cern. Research has shown that perceived discrimination heightens inter-group dif-
ferentiation (Cronin et al. 2011), promotes activism and protest (Gurr 1993), reduces 
cooperation (Jasinskaja-Lahti et  al. 2009), and is associated with the rejection of 
democracy and democratic institutions overall (Maxwell 2014). Many studies have 
documented a rise in election-related incidents and violence in Africa since the re-
introduction of multi-party elections in the 1990s and political contests have been 
described as “do or die affairs” (Bratton 2008; De Smedt 2009).
It is important to note that these findings should not be interpreted as evidence 
against the benefits of competitive elections. In fact, all anxiety indicators are higher 
for non-competitive elections.16 This means that where competition is high, ethnic 
anxieties and levels of inter-ethnic trust fluctuate in relation to the electoral cycle. In 
light of these findings, political competition should be welcomed and encouraged, 
but policies and institutions designed to ensure fairness and alleviate ethnic tensions 
closer to elections will be crucial to successful democratization in Africa as elec-
tions become more competitive.
A number of limitations exist regarding the generalizability of the results, remain-
ing response bias related to the attitudinal measures used in the paper, and the poten-
tial for omitted variable bias. The seventeen countries included in the sample may 
not be representative of African countries overall. The Afrobarometer only collects 
data on countries where there is no civil conflict, and which have a nominal level of 
democracy so the results generalize accordingly. Nevertheless, given the theoreti-
cal interest in the effect of the electoral environment on individual identification, a 
sample of countries holding regular elections with varying levels of competitiveness 
is appropriate. Despite various measures taken to address response bias in Afroba-
rometer interview data, it does remain a concern given the sensitive nature of the 
questions. Yet, the fact that all affective variables exhibit significant movement in 
one direction in response to the political environment and in accordance with theory 
from several disciplines, which is also in line with case study research, increases 
confidence in the results.
Finally, could the same factors driving the rise of competitiveness in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa also increase ethnic anxieties? The literature suggests several drivers of 
competitiveness on the continent: financial liberalization, increased voter educa-
tion and sophistication as a result of ongoing modernization and urbanization, and 
higher party institutionalization. These are all relatively slowly unfolding processes 
unlikely to change on a monthly basis. Given the findings regarding the effects of 
the survey timing on national identification (the former being exogenous to competi-
tiveness), the nested data structure and fixed effects framework adopted in the paper 
should account for such potential national-level confounders.
16 The perceived discrimination mean is 0.69 for competitive elections compared to 0.62 for less-com-
petitive ones and 0.71 for landslides; the economic anxiety mean is 1.108 for competitive elections, 
1.129 for less competitive ones and 1.113 for landslides; the political anxiety mean is 1.048 for competi-
tive elections, 1.230 for less competitive ones and 1.063 for landslides; the ethnic trust mean is 1.94 for 
competitive elections, 1.57 for less competitive ones, and 1.74 for landslides.
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Because I am interested in how the electoral cycle interacts with the competi-
tiveness of national-level elections to impact individual attitudes and perceptions, 
the framework adopted in this paper does not capture sub-national factors, which 
could vary within survey rounds over time and also influence citizens’ attitudes and 
identities. These include differences in competitiveness levels locally, regional pro-
tests or violence, cultural events (eg. traditional festivals or commemorative events), 
and other regional economic, political or environmental factors. While undoubtedly 
important, if the rise in ethnic anxieties close to competitive elections in Africa was 
largely due to local factors, it would have been difficult to obtain statistically signifi-
cant results for national-level variables. Nevertheless, this is a fruitful area for future 
research.
Conclusion
This paper provides the first cross-national empirical test of the effects of politi-
cal competition on ethnic groups’ status anxieties and presents strong evidence 
that these anxieties peak close to competitive elections. While the empirical focus 
is on Sub-Saharan Africa, the findings are relevant to plural democracies more 
broadly. A key take-away is that group anxieties and ethnic grievances rise and 
fall with electoral cycles. Understanding and addressing this cyclical variation 
is crucial for the success of both democracy and nation-building in multi-ethnic 
states.
The paper also shows that political competition reduces national relative to 
ethnic identification in Sub-Saharan Africa. This result is important because the 
relative salience of ethnic versus national identity is an indirect measure of eth-
nocentrism, which has been blamed for a number of ills throughout the world. 
Two potential mechanisms can account for this shift: instrumental motivations 
and ethnic anxieties. Of the two, I find stronger evidence for the presence of the 
anxieties mechanism. This is in line with theories from social psychology posit-
ing that ethnic identification is undertaken in response to perceived discrimina-
tion and relative status concerns. Although the increase of ethnic anxieties around 
competitive elections in Africa appears to be affective in nature, this does not 
imply instrumental motivations do not play a part. Fears of loss of status and the 
desire to seek refuge in group belonging are perfectly rational responses to per-
ceived threat and discrimination. Thus, the two mechanisms likely operate in tan-
dem and instrumental motivations are expressed through affective responses, in 
survey responses in particular. Future research should strive to better integrate the 
instrumental and affective aspects of group identities and the types of responses 
different survey measures invite.
Finally, in light of findings regarding the importance of local ethnic geogra-
phy for levels of intra-ethnic tolerance (Kasara 2013) and the varying levels of 
competitiveness among core and swing regions within the same state (Horowitz 
2015), future research can study sub-national variation in the effect of proximity 
to competitive elections on ethnic identification and group anxieties. Given the 
well-established link between ethnic anxieties, (violent) protests, and the rejection 
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of common institutions, understanding such sub-national variation would be key 
to identifying likely hotspots and devising targeted solutions able to mitigate the 
divisiveness of rising electoral competitiveness in Africa’s highly diverse states.
Supplementary Information The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1110 9-021-
09684 -z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Madhavi Devasher, Michalis Moutselos, and Shana Warren for 
comments on earlier versions of this paper and three anonymous reviewers for immensely constructive 
feedback. I am also grateful to Hannah Vester for research help and for funding provided by the Princeton 
Institute for International and Regional Studies and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious 
and Ethnic Diversity.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
References
Aspinall, E. (2007). The construction of grievance natural resources and identity in a separatist conflict. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 950–972.
Barreto, M. A., & Pedraza, F. I. (2009). The renewal and persistence of group identification in American 
politics. Electoral Studies, 28(4), 595–605.
Barth, F. (1998). Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture difference. Waveland 
Press.
Bates, R. H. (1983). Modernization, ethnic competition, and the rationality of politics in contemporary 
africa. State Versus Ethnic Claims, 152, 171.
Bhavnani, R., & Miodownik, D. (2009). Ethnic polarization, ethnic salience, and civil war. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 53(1), 30–49.
Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. Pacific Sociological Review, 1, 3–7.
Bogardus, E. S. (1928). Immigration and race attitudes.
Boone, C. (2011). Politically allocated land rights and the geography of electoral violence: The case of 
kenya in the 1990s. Comparative Political Studies, 0010414011407465.
Bossuroy, T. (2008). Ethnicity as a resource in social capital. Paris School of Economics, DIAL: 
Typescript.
Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in nigerian election campaigns. Electoral Studies, 27(4), 
621–632.
Brewer, M. B. (1981). Ethnocentrism and its role in interpersonal trust. Scientific Inquiry and the Social 
Sciences, 214, 231.
Burbidge, D. (2014). ‘can someone get me outta this middle class zone?!’ressures on middle class kikuyu 
in Kenya’s 2013 election. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 52(02), 205–225.
Carlson, E. (2015). Ethnic voting and accountability in Africa: A choice experiment in Uganda. World 
Politics, 67, 353.
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Hug, S. (2013). Elections and ethnic civil war. Comparative Politi-
cal Studies, 46(3), 387–417.
Cederman, L.-E., Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2010). Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis. 
World Politics, 62(1), 87–119.
1 3
Political Behavior 
Chandra, K. (2007). Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Chandra, K. (2012). Constructivist theories of ethnic politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Collier, P. (2011). Wars, guns and votes: Democracy in dangerous places. New York: Random House.
Random House.
Conroy-Krutz, J. (2016). Electoral campaigns as learning opportunities: Lessons from Uganda. African 
Affairs.
Conroy-Krutz, J., Moehler, D. C., & Aguilar, R. (2016). Partisan cues and vote choice in new multiparty 
systems. Comparative Political Studies, 49(1), 3–35.
Cronin, T.  J., S. Levin, N. R. Branscombe, C. van Laar, and L. R. Tropp (2011). Ethnic identification 
in response to perceived discrimination protects well-being and promotes activism: A longitudinal 
study of latino college students. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 1368430211427171.
Curini, L., Jou, W., & Memoli, V. (2012). Satisfaction with democracy and the winner/loser debate: The 
role of policy preferences and past experience. British Journal of Political Science, 42(2), 241–261.
De Smedt, J. (2009). ‘No raila, no peace!’big man politics and election violence at the Kibera grassroots. 
African Affairs, 108(433), 581–598.
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1203–1250.
Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion, institutions, and growth. Economics & 
Politics, 18(2), 103–120.
Eifert, B., Miguel, E., & Posner, D. N. (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. 
American Journal of Political Science, 54(2), 494–510.
Fearon, J. D. (1999). Why ethnic politics and ‘pork’ tend to go together. In an SSRC-MacArthur spon-
sored conference on “Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability,” University of Chicago.
Fearon, J. D. (2003). Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 
195–222.
Ferree, K. E. (2006). Explaining south Africa’s racial census. The Journal of Politics, 68(4), 803–815.
Ferree, K. E. (2010). Framing the race in South Africa: The political origins of racial census elections. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Franklin, M. N., et  al. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established 
democracies since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gadjanova, E. (2013). What is an ethnic appeal? Policies as metonymies for ethnicity in the political 
rhetoric of group identity. Ethnopolitics, 12(3), 307–330.
Gadjanova, E. (2017). Electoral clientelism as status affirmation in Africa: evidence from Ghana. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 55(4), 593–621.
Gelman, A., & Hill, J. (2006). Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giebler, H., S.  Banducci, & S.  Kritzinger (2017). New perspectives on information and electoral 
competition.
Gurr, T. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 
1945. International Political Science Review, 14(2), 161–201.
Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Coethnicity: Diversity and 
the dilemmas of collective action. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Hale, H. (2008). The foundations of ethnic politics: Separatism of states and nations in Eurasia and the 
world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hansen, K. M., & Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2017). How campaigns polarize the electorate: Political polari-
zation as an effect of the minimal effect theory within a multi-party system. Party Politics, 23(3), 
181–192.
Harrington, J. E, Jr., & Hess, G. D. (1996). A spatial theory of positive and negative campaigning. Games 
and Economic behavior, 17(2), 209–229.
Herbst, J. (1989). The creation and matintenance of national boundaries in Africa. International Organi-
zation, 43(04), 673–692.
Higashijima, M., & Houle, C. (2018). Ethnic inequality and the strength of ethnic identities in sub-saha-
ran Africa. Political Behavior, 40(4), 909–932.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.
Horowitz, J. (2015). The ethnic logic of campaign strategy in diverse societies: Theory and evidence from 
kenya. Comparative Political Studies.
 Political Behavior
1 3
Ichino, N., & Nathan, N. L. (2013). Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana. 
American Political Science Review, 107(02), 344–361.
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology a social identity perspective on polariza-
tion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405–431.
Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Liebkind, K., & Solheim, E. (2009). To identify or not to identify? National disiden-
tification as an alternative reaction to perceived ethnic discrimination. Applied Psychology, 58(1), 
105–128.
Kasara, K. (2013). Separate and suspicious: Local social and political context and ethnic tolerance in 
Kenya. The Journal of Politics, 75(04), 921–936.
Kramon, E. (2011). Why do politicians buy votes when the ballot is secret? Theory and experimental evi-
dence from Kenya. Stanford: Working Group on African Political Economy.
Kuo, A., & Margalit, Y. (2012). Measuring individual identity: Experimental evidence. Comparative Pol-
itics, 44(4), 459–479.
LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group 
behavior. New York: Wiley.
Maxwell, R. (2009). Caribbean and south Asian identification with British society: The importance of 
perceived discrimination. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32(8), 1449–1469.
Maxwell, R. (2014). Perceived discrimination across institutional fields: Racial minorities in the united 
kingdom. European Sociological Review, jcu094.
McCulloch, C.  E. and J.  M. Neuhaus (2005). Generalized linear mixed models. Encyclopedia of 
biostatistics 4.
Michelitch, K. (2015). Does electoral competition exacerbate interethnic or interpartisan economic dis-
crimination? Evidence from a field experiment in market price bargaining. American Political Sci-
ence Review, 109(1), 43–61.
Miguel, E., & Posner, D. N. (2006). Sources of ethnic identification in Africa. Berkeley: University of 
California.
Moehler, D. C. (2009). Critical citizens and submissive subjects: Election losers and winners in africa. 
British Journal of Political Science, 39(2), 345–366.
Nugent, P. (2001). Winners, losers and also rans: Money, moral authority and voting patterns in the 
Ghana 2000 election. African Affairs, 100(400), 405–428.
Paget, D. (2019). The rally-intensive campaign: A distinct form of electioneering in sub-saharan Africa 
and beyond. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 24(4), 444–464.
Peterson, R. D. (2002). Understanding ethnic violence. New York: Cambridge University.
Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Posner, D. N., & Young, D. J. (2007). The institutionalization of political power in Africa. Journal of 
Democracy, 18(3), 126–140.
Rabe-Hesketh, S. and A.  Skrondal (2008). Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata. STATA 
press.
Robinson, A. L. (2014). National versus ethnic identification in Africa: Modernization, colonial legacy, 
and the origins of territorial nationalism. World Politics, 66(04), 709–746.
Sambanis, N. (2001). Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empiri-
cal inquiry (part 1). Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3), 259–282.
Sherif, M., O. Harvey, B.  J. White, W. R. Hood, and C. W. Sherif (1961). Intergroup cooperation and 
competition: The robbers cave experiment.
Skaperdas, S., & Grofman, B. (1995). Modeling negative campaigning. American Political Science 
Review, 89(1), 49–61.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33(1), 1–39.
Trumm, S., Sudulich, L., & Townsley, J. (2017). Information effect on voter turnout: How campaign 
spending mobilises voters. Acta Politica, 52(4), 461–478.
Varshney, A. (2003). Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and rationality. Perspectives on Politics, 85–99.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley.
Weghorst, K. R., & Lindberg, S. I. (2013). What drives the swing voter in Africa? American Journal of 
Political Science, 57(3), 717–734.
Wilkinson, S. (2005). Religious Politics and Communal Violence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wimmer, A. (1997). Who owns the state? Understanding ethnic conflict in post-colonial societies. 
Nations and Nationalism, 3(4), 631–666.
Wimmer, A. (2008). The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: A multilevel process theory. Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 113(4), 970–1022.
1 3
Political Behavior 
Wimmer, A. (2013). Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power, networks. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2016). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Nelson Education.
Young, C. (1979). The politics of cultural pluralism. Madison: Univ of Wisconsin Press.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
